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— Unpacking the core themes that are discussed in this collection, this article both offers a re-
search agenda to re-analyse Turkey’s ‘authoritarian turn’ and mounts a methodological chal-
lenge to the conceptual frameworks that reinforce a strict analytical separation between the 
‘economic’ and the ‘political’ factors. he paper problematises the temporal break in scholarly 
analyses of the AKP period and rejects the argument that the party’s methods of governance 
have shited from an earlier ‘democratic’ model – deined by ‘hegemony’ – to an emergent 
‘authoritarian’ one. In contrast, by retracing the mechanisms of the state-led reproduction of 
neoliberalism since 2003, the paper demonstrates that the party’s earlier ‘hegemonic’ activi-
ties were also shaped by authoritarian tendencies which manifested at various levels of gov-
ernance. 
AKP ▪ ︎authoritarianism ▪ ︎democratic backsliding ▪ ︎neoliberalism ▪ ︎Turkey 
Authoritarian Neoliberalism & Democratic Backsliding in Turkey
he recent trajectory of Turkish politics under the government of the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma 
Partisi – Justice and Development Party) is increasingly positioned as a signature node in the global 
web of ‘democratic backsliding’. he latter concerns contemporary cases of democratic debilitation 
deined by ‘promissory coups’, ‘executive aggrandisement’ and ‘longer-term strategic harassment 
and manipulation’ of the electoral processes.  Once touted as a ‘model democracy’ (Akyol 2011; cf. 1
Bâli 2011) for a region in turmoil, the academic and ‘popular’  portrayals of AKP’s Turkey have 2
changed gradually from 2011 to 2013 onwards. his is a period marked by the party’s third electoral 
victory and the intensiication of its subsequent attacks on rights and freedoms as demonstrated by 
the Gezi Park protests. In contrast to the earlier positive assessments of the party’s irst two terms in 
office (2002–2007 and 2007–2011), the 2011–2013 period has come to be seen as a watershed. Ater 
this period, the terms of the debate have shited from unpacking the mechanisms of the party’s self-
proclaimed ‘conservative democracy’ (Özbudun 2006; Duran 2008) to charting its ‘authoritarian 
turn’ (Benhabib 2013). 
 his recent focus has spawned a considerable literature that attempts to explain the conjunction 
of AKP’s authoritarian streak with its ongoing commitment to a minimal representative democracy 
and its insistence on legitimising itself by invoking a majoritarian conception of a ‘national will’ – 
justiied by the party’s electoral success. Accordingly, positioned against the earlier image of a (lib-
eral) ‘democratic’ agent of reform, AKP in recent literature emerges as a regressive political actor 
which is steering the country away from ‘democracy’ and towards a ‘hybrid’ regime (Aslan-Akman 
2012, p. 92; Öniş 2016, p. 141), deined variously as a ‘delegative democracy’ (Taş 2015; Özbudun 
2014, pp. 162–163), ‘competitive authoritarianism’ (Özbudun 2015; Esen & Gümüşçü 2016), ‘elec-
toral authoritarianism’ (Kaya 2015) or an ‘unconsolidated democracy’ (Mütüler-Baç & Keyman 
2015).  In short, while there is no agreement on the exact typology to account for the transforma3 -
tion of the political regime in Turkey, there is an emergent consensus that AKP’s recent years have 
been deined by an explicit authoritarian shit. 
 Is this increasingly visible dissonance in the analyses of the AKP government merely a product 
of the party’s changing political orientation? To what extent does AKP’s ‘authoritarian turn’repre-
sent a qualitative break from the party’s earlier practices and policy priorities – and, thus, a case in 
‘democratic backsliding’? Does a focus on AKP’s ‘authoritarian turn’ offer a productive comparative 
angle with which to examine cases of ‘re-authoritarianisation’ (Cook 2016) in other parts of the 
world? his volume zooms in on these questions and challenges the parameters within which 
AKP’s ‘authoritarian turn’ has been examined in the recent literature.  
 Our contributions do not refute the argument that AKP’s post 2011–2013 trajectory has been 
shaped by increasingly authoritarian modalities of governance. However, we contend that prioritis-
ing the 2011–2013 period as a decisive break from an earlier AKP-led period of democratisation 
and as the key juncture that produced the structures of an authoritarian regime to come is prob-
lematic on conceptual, analytical and empirical grounds. Underscoring this break, oten inadver-
tently, has led scholars to analyse the transformation of the Turkish political regime on the basis of 
two competing, temporally bound images of AKP. 
 In the irst portrayal (corresponding to the 2003–2007/10 period), AKP is positioned broadly as 
a democratic party with a clear intent on reviving the sclerotic Turkish economy through liberalisa-
tion and reinforcing the country’s EU candidacy bid through civilianisation and democratic re-
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forms. In the second period (from 2011, and particularly, 2013 onwards), AKP is clad in the mantle 
of a decaying hegemonic force that relies increasingly on ‘coercion’, rather than ‘consent’, to enforce 
its policies and shape an ever-increasing portion of the everyday lives of Turkey’s citizens. We argue 
that these two images should be understood, not as diametrically opposed regimes with inherently 
contradicting modalities of rule, but as two interlinked nodes on the spectrum of a now-apparent 
authoritarian governance. In other words, we emphasise the importance of placing the two periods 
in a continuum whereby the ‘authoritarian’ practices of the later AKP rule can be retraced to – and 
properly understood in – the context of its earlier ‘democratic’ incarnation.  4
 In addition to rejecting this clear-cut temporal disassociation of AKP’s ‘democratic’ and ‘author-
itarian’phases, we further challenge a major conceptual pitfall in the literature which has played a 
key, yet oten unacknowledged, role in the perpetuation of the temporal break narrative. A signii-
cant shortcoming in the existing literature on contemporary Turkish politics and political economy 
is the commitment to theoretical approaches and the adoption of certain ontological positions that 
presume a categorical distinction between the ‘economic’ and ‘political’ spheres.  We posit that the 5
literature, even in its more critical corners, has subscribed to a binary conception of ‘politics’ and 
‘economics’ (as well as ‘state’ and ‘civil society’), and failed to adequately contextualise how the 
questions of political economy (e.g. production, accumulation, (re)distribution, wealth) feature in 
AKP’s ‘authoritarian turn’. In other words, the questions of ‘political economy’ are either let out of 
the analytical purview or they are treated separately from the ‘political’ questions of democracy, 
political reform and fundamental rights.  6
 his separation has resulted in the proliferation of academic and popular analyses that project a 
parallax view of AKP’s governance, dominated by competing ‘economic’ and ‘political’ narratives – 
two narratives of progress that also clearly map onto the periodisation we have identiied above. 
he ‘political’ version of this narrative portrays the party as an initially civil society-oriented, de-
mocratic actor that successfully tackled the vestiges of the ‘tutelary’ forces in Turkish politics. In 
this narrative, the party’s early democratic impetus gradually gives way to a more authoritarian 
single-party orientation which becomes particularly visible ater 2011–2013. he economic coun-
terpart of this position similarly brandishes a largely positive account of the party’s early economic 
policies on the basis of the improvements on several key macroeconomic indicators (most impor-
tantly, the GDP growth rate, FDI inlows and inlation reduction). While the decline of the ‘eco-
nomic’ success narrative is not as pronounced as its ‘political’ equivalent ater the 2011–2013 peri-
od, we can observe a similar trend in the increasing number of critical commentaries that zoomed 
in on the fault lines of AKP’s neoliberal orientation. 
 In the rest of this discussion, I will irst unpack the conceptual parameters of authoritarian ne-
oliberalism, and highlight how the proposed framework allows us to retrace more fully the prac-
tices and mechanisms that comprise AKP’s ‘authoritarian turn’. his is followed by an exploration of 
how the above-outlined narratives of progress have materialised in an epistemic space that com-
prise contributions from a broad network of social science research. I will then discuss, in line with 
our contributions, how rethinking the trajectory of AKP’s governance through authoritarian ne-
oliberalism provides us with a more productive avenue for investigating the ‘authoritarian turn’. 
his strategy can also offer a remedy for the conceptual shortcomings that have engendered the 
bifurcated analyses of AKP rule in the irst place. 
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Overcoming conceptual and temporal disjunctures in the study of the AKP era  
In order to overcome the shortcomings of this myopic periodisation, we utilise and further reine 
the concept of authoritarian neoliberalism to demonstrate how the political, socio-economic, insti-
tutional and ideological components of AKP’s ‘authoritarian turn’ materialised in an extended 
timeframe – including the party’s so-called ‘golden age’ (Öniş 2016, p. 142; Aktaş 2017, p. 176). In 
line with the growing interdisciplinary literature on the concept and on the analogous disciplinary/
coercive aspects of neoliberalism,  we position authoritarian neoliberalism as a mode of gover7 -
nance that operates on twin principles. hese are (1) establishing a disciplinary statecrat which 
closes off key decision-making processes to popular pressures, public input and non-partisan audit-
ing mechanisms – particularly, but not exclusively, with a view to protecting the circuits of capital 
accumulation, and (2) deploying the coercive, legal and administrative state apparatuses to margin-
alise democratic opposition and dissident social groups (Tansel 2017b, p. 3). Viewed through this 
lens, we can chart the continuity from the earlier ‘democratic’ phase of AKP rule to its late ‘authori-
tarian’ incarnation, by rendering visible both the molecular and systemic changes that AKP gov-
ernments have enacted in the already fragile democratic composition of Turkey. 
 Given that the literature is crowded with a wide array of concepts purporting to possess signii-
cant explanatory and analytical powers in relation to the recent trajectory of Turkish politics, one 
may ask why is it important to re-evaluate AKP’s governance through the prism of authoritarian 
neoliberalism. We contend that a renewed focus on authoritarian neoliberalism helps us rectify the 
two key shortcomings of the recent literature identiied above. Consequently, instead of subscribing 
to the view that AKP’s trajectory should be understood in two distinct periods (i.e. a ‘democratic’ 
trajectory from 2002 to 2007–2010 and an ‘authoritarian turn’ from 2011 to 2013 onwards), we un-
pack the actors, developments and processes that preigured and constituted AKP’s ‘authoritarian 
neoliberalism’ from 2002 onwards. 
 We investigate the ‘repertoires’ of authoritarian neoliberalism, i.e. the ways in which AKP has 
consolidated (1) its economic model, and (2) its ‘securitarian’ regime (Manunza 2017, p. 130) by 
focusing on a number of constitutive reconigurations in the state apparatuses and state–civil soci-
ety interactions. hese include, inter alia, (1) the centralisation of economic and political decision-
making (i.e. executive centralisation); (2) transformation of the rule of law through executive and 
judiciary interventions; (3) reorienting key administrative and bureaucratic functions of the state in 
line with the governing party’s strategic interests; (4) reconiguring media ownership through state 
interventions; (5) de-collectivising workplace organisation and labour relations; and (6) reproduc-
ing discourses of mobilisation and consent generation that are based on existing gendered, 
racialised and class-based hierarchies. 
 Linking these developments back to a broader authoritarian neoliberal model should not be 
read as an effort to reinscribe economic determinism or to advance monocausal explanations. On 
the contrary, we contend that emphasising the centrality of such political economic processes – as 
we do in this volume – allows us to investigate the modalities of AKP’s governance more extensive-
ly and to highlight the practices and processes that helped entrench its authoritarian rule more ex-
plicitly. he concept further illuminates how the emergent ‘authoritarian bent in state practices can 
work in tandem with institutions and legal frameworks that sustain a “minimalist” 
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democracy’ (Tansel 2017b, p. 11; Møller & Skaaning 2010, p. 276). his thus guards us against posi-
tioning ‘Western liberal democracy as the only form for imagining “the political”’ (Lowe 2015, p. 
198n.54), and situating ideal-type liberal democratic institutions and practices as an effective anti-
dote to the vagaries of ‘authoritarian’ regimes. 
 Authoritarian neoliberalism further complicates the operationalisation of ‘neoliberalism’ in the 
existing literature by not equating ‘neoliberalism’ with ‘free markets’ or ‘marketisation’. he concept 
of neoliberalism, both in the wider social sciences literature and in works focusing on the Turkish 
case, has retained a close affiliation with the processes of marketisation – an orientation that has led 
many scholars to magnify the impact of ‘free markets’ at the expense of recognising the constitutive 
role of the state in co-producing and maintaining those markets. Compared against a global tem-
plate that strictly conceptualised neoliberalism as marketisation, some scholars have suggested that 
the Turkish trajectory during the AKP period signals a different modus operandi as it ‘differs from 
the thick versions of free market fundamentalism’ (Keyman 2010, p. 316; cf. Buğra & Savaşkan 
2014, p. 8; Tansel 2017c). Authoritarian neoliberalism helps us reorient this picture by reaffirming 
(1) the state’s role and function in reproducing neoliberalism, and (2) the signiicance of analysing 
neoliberal policies beyond marketisation, as vehicles to transform the relationship between states, 
households and ‘the economy’ on a signiicantly expanded logic of commodiication.  
 Finally, it is important to stress that we do not aim to project a seamless account of AKP’s gov-
ernance from its inception to the present day. In other words, our insistence on recognising the full 
spectrum of authoritarian neoliberalism in Turkey should not be read as an effort to latten out the 
variations in AKP’s policies and strategies. On the contrary, our approach allows us to examine the 
seemingly changing parameters of politics ater 2011– 2013, not by collapsing all developments into 
a preigured authoritarian template, but by charting the concrete policies and practices that gradu-
ally constituted AKP’s authoritarian neoliberal regime. Our contributions thus demonstrate that the 
‘normal’ operation of liberal democracy and the implementation of neoliberal policies can com-
plement, and even facilitate, the emergence of intently authoritarian practices (Tansel 2017b, p. 11; 
Bekmen 2014, p. 47). 
he rise and fall of AKP’s narratives of progress  
Before detailing how the twin narratives of progress shaped the analyses of the AKP period in the 
literature, it is important to return to the immediate political and socio-economic context in which 
AKP came to power in November 2002. At the turn of the twenty-irst century, Turkey was reeling 
from a decade of political and economic instability which was marked by successive economic 
crises, erratic coalition governments and intensiied conlict with the PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kur-
distanê – Kurdistan Workers’ Party). he trial-and-error approach to deepening liberalisation in the 
1990s culminated in a major economic crisis in 2001 which shrank the economy ‘at an unprece-
dented rate of some 9.5%’ (Akyüz & Boratav 2003, p. 1550). By 2002, the dominant precepts of cen-
trist party politics were exhausted and the public showed no inclination to further support what 
was clearly a failing economic and political programme. 
 he European Commission’s Eurobarometer 2001 report captured this bleak mood very well. In 
surveys conducted in October 2001, 56 per cent of the respondents from Turkey reported that their 
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conditions had deteriorated in the past ive years, while only 30 per cent displayed any optimism 
that their situation would get better in the next ive years (European Commission 2002, pp. 15–16). 
Respondents gave overwhelmingly negative assessments about both their individual and the coun-
try’s general economic prospects, with 74 per cent responding that the economic situation in the 
country would get worse in 2002 and 54 per cent expecting a deterioration in their household i-
nances in 2002 (European Commission 2002, pp. 18–22). he report further identiied two key 
trends, the popular expressions of which would help bring AKP to power in November 2002. Euro-
barometer reported that only 13 per cent of respondents trusted political parties (European Com-
mission 2002, p. 24), yet 59 per cent supported Turkey’s EU membership and 77 per cent of those 
who indicated that they would vote in a membership referendum claimed that they would vote for 
EU entry (European Commission 2002, pp. 56–58). 
 he deeply entrenched dissatisfaction with traditional party politics, coupled with economic 
insecurity and a widespread desire for substantial political and economic change – as indicated by 
the support for EU membership – signalled that the voters were ready to embrace an alternative 
which the recently established AKP would come to represent. When the twin crises of November 
2000 and February 2001 brought down the Turkish economy, the culprit in public perception for 
what seemed to be a recurring theme in the country’s post 1980 economic liberalisation was found 
in the political establishment. he coalition government’s fundamental inability to steer a course 
out of the crisis greatly facilitated AKP’s landslide electoral victory in 2002 (Öniş 2009, pp. 415–
416). 
 herefore, right from the outset, the AKP’s political ascendancy materialised in a context de-
ined by an explicit popular desire for economic and political reform, which the party switly capi-
talised on by underscoring its newcomer status and its commitment to ‘competence, integrity, and 
democracy’ (Öniş & Keyman 2003, p. 99). As with many other threads in the global fabric of ne-
oliberalisations, AKP rose on a ‘new social consensus on the basis of steadily increasing productivi-
ty, economic growth and a limited generalisation of prosperity’ (Rupert 1995, p. 83). Subsequent 
analyses of the party’s political and economic performance, particularly in its early years, were 
coloured both by the crisis-ridden years of governance that marked the pre-AKP period, and the 
party’s rise as an alternative to a paralysed party politics ‘known more for economic populism, 
clientelism, and corruption than for democratic accountability’ (Öniş & Keyman 2003, p. 95). 
he narrative of economic progress  
Given the popular dissatisfaction with the immediate economic results of liberalisation in the early 
2000s, one might assume that AKP’s rise to political power would have indicated a sea change in 
economic policy. Yet, AKP’s solution to the ongoing economic woes, far from charting an alterna-
tive trajectory, was entirely in line with the IMF-backed reform package devised by the preceding 
coalition government (Aydın 2013, p. 101). As the OECD’s 2002 review suggested, despite two 
decades of neoliberalisation, Turkey was ‘still in a state of transition, and competition policy is not 
yet fully integrated into general policy’ (2002, p. 12). Accordingly, AKP took the necessary mea-
sures to reinstate the faith of the country’s long-list of creditors by pledging allegiance to a pro-
gramme approved by major international inancial institutions. 
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 he subsequent reform packages, which entailed a considerable shit in public spending, were 
devised to be implemented in accordance with a macroeconomic policy that prioritised inlation 
reduction, further trade liberalisation and attracting foreign investment. he short-term positive 
balance sheet of this strategy, which was marked by (uneven) GDP growth, inlation reduction and 
signiicant increases in FDI lows led to the production of a narrative of economic progress. Not-
withstanding some cautionary examples, this largely legitimised the government’s economic orien-
tation. By focusing predominantly on select macroeconomic indicators and eschewing any system-
atic analyses of the social ramiications of pursuing ‘growth’ policies, most early accounts of AKP’s 
economic programme made positive assessments. hese failed to problematise the survival and 
strengthening of neoliberal precepts – liberalisation, inancialisation, dependency on foreign capi-
tal, and the shrinking of the rights and collective power of labour – that had created the cycle of 
volatility in the 1980s and 1990s (Yeldan 2006, p. 206). 
 As early as 2003, AKP’s then incipient economic programme was cast as a desirable alternative 
to failed ‘neoliberal’ and state-controlled economic models. Asserting the importance of perceiving 
AKP policy as an incarnation of ‘hird Way’ politics, Ziya Öniş and Fuat Keyman (2003, p. 100) 
claimed the party’s model signalled the emergence of a ‘postdevelopmental’ state ‘that effectively 
contributes to the development of a free-market economy without actually repressing the market 
mechanism’. For Öniş and Keyman, the emergent economic model was not neoliberal, as the state 
would ‘underwrite and safeguard a basically free but intelligently regulated market economy’ (2003, 
p. 97). his was a position which both authors would eventually abandon, substituting it with an 
emphasis on the AKP government’s ‘neoliberalism’ (Öniş 2009; Keyman & Gümüşçü 2014; cf. 
Keyman 2010, p. 316). his position betrayed a fundamental inability to both conceptualise and 
explain the concrete practices of neoliberalism, as the two authors simply equated neoliberal re-
form with unfettered market deregulation and state withdrawal.  8
 Yet while the preferred nomenclature to classify AKP’s economic programme gradually reverted 
back to‘neoliberalism’, the seemingly successful macroeconomic performance also led to a rehabili-
tation of the neoliberal model to the extent that neoliberalism came to be seen as the blueprint of 
AKP’s economic success. Fuat Keyman and Şebnem Gümüşçü (2014, p. 91, emphasis added) artic-
ulated this position explicitly in their claim that ‘many Arab states have come to regard Turkey’s 
impressive growth rate and the improvements in its citizens’ economic well-being under AKP’s 
neoliberal economic policy as a source of awe and inspiration’. An oten poorly understood and mis-
represented portrayal of macroeconomic performance (cf. Subaşat 2014; Yeldan & Ünüvar 2015) 
effectively legitimised the view that ‘Turkey owes its economic success to the strengthening and 
implementation of the free-market oriented liberal economic philosophy’ (Oğuzlu 2011, p. 986; see 
also Dağı 2008, p. 29). 
 Improvements in individual markers of this (neoliberal) ‘economic philosophy’ came to domi-
nate the overall assessments of AKP policies. Accordingly, Öniş (2009, p. 423) highlighted the ‘vir-
tuous cycle’ of investment in AKP’s early years, whereby ‘improvement[s] in the overall macro-
economic and macropolitical environment’ led to ‘a signiicant increase in the quantity of FDI low-
ing into the Turkish economy, [and]… a major increase in privatisation revenues’.  Many other 9
analyses highlighted that economic growth ‘surged’ ater 2001.  hese accounts placed signiicant 10
emphasis on growth igures – which largely lose their signiicance when contextualised against 
high-growth rates in similar ‘emerging economies’ since 2002 (see Tansel 2017c). Frequent refer-
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ences to economic growth manifested without qualiications, even in critical accounts which noted 
AKP’s command over a ‘relatively stable and growing economy’.  his tendency to prioritise 11
macroeconomic indicators has developed in tandem with an indifference to tracing the concrete 
ways in which the policies that engendered this ‘growing’ economy were reshaping both the state 
apparatuses and the households’ conditions of social reproduction. Contrary to those social scien-
tists and economists who consistently underscored the contradictions of AKP’s economic pro-
gramme (see note 6), those who subscribed to a narrative of AKP-led economic growth failed to 
investigate the wide-ranging effects of a growth model focused on privatisation, inancialisation, 
foreign investment, increased commodiication and attacks on collective rights which resulted in 
qualitative changes in industrial relations, patterns of employment and household indebtedness 
(Karaçimen 2014, 2015; Çelik 2015). 
 In contrast, scholars who provided a positive balance sheet of AKP’s early economic programme 
continued to assess the country’s socio-economic conditions through a narrow lens even ater the 
2007–2008 global economic crisis. It is not uncommon to ind claims in the literature that ‘Turkey 
[has not only] remained relatively unaffected by the inancial and economic crisis, but its economic 
performance . . . has been impressive’ (Keyman & Gümüşçü 2014, pp. 38–39), despite the signii-
cant evidence to the contrary that demonstrates the acute impact of the crisis on households and 
the economy in general (Aytaç, Rankin & İbikoğlu 2014). 
he narrative of political progress 
he ‘political’ counterpart of this narrative coalesced around AKP’s early portrayal as a force of de-
mocratisation and harbinger of a new type of politics, allowing civil societal actors to take prece-
dence over ossiied state elites. hroughout its irst two terms in office, the party was perceived by 
many observers in academia, international and national media and policy-making circles as a vehi-
cle for regional stability and greater democratisation.  Many recognised AKP’s democratic creden12 -
tials by highlighting its battles with ‘tutelary’ state apparatuses such as the military, as well as the 
party’s‘activist foreign policy’(Aras & Görener 2010; cf. Robins 2013), its (potential) capacity to 
bridge Islam and democracy (Kanra 2005; Nasr 2005), and its role in launching ‘democratic open-
ings’ (Keyman 2010; Kirişci 2011; cf. Çiçek 2011). 
 Following AKP’s irst election triumph, Ziya Öniş and Fuat Keyman welcomed the new political 
environment by declaring that ‘Turkey has inally elected a single-party government that strongly 
believes in economic reform, basically respects the IMF framework, and wants full-ledged EU 
membership’ (2003, p. 105). For others, AKP represented a historic opportunity to overcome the 
country’s seemingly innate inability to chart an ‘exit from the authoritarian regime established ater 
the military coup of September 12, 1980’ (İnsel 2003, p. 306). At the international level, the symbio-
sis of the party’s pro-EU position and its self-styled conservative democratic position elicited pre-
dominantly positive responses and AKP was cast in the role of ‘a peace broker in multiple cultural, 
religious and political arenas’ (Sandole 2009, p. 648; cf. Arkan & Kınacıoglu 2016). 
 he party’s repeated attempts at constitutional reform, its ‘civilianisation’ efforts (Cizre 2011; 
Gürsoy 2012; Bardakçı 2013) and its consequent battles with the apparatuses of the so-called ‘tute-
lary regime’ (Aydınlı 2013; cf. Akça & Balta-Paker 2012) led some observers to represent AKP as an 
agent of ‘subaltern democratisation’ (Yel & Nas 2013), a denomination that neatly mapped onto the 
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party’s own claim to represent the ‘national will’ (see Bilgiç 2018). AKP’s seemingly successful for-
mula of ‘conservative democracy’ was further framed as a potential blueprint for democratisation 
in other countries in the Middle East and North Africa.  In the pre-Gezi landscape, this dominant 13
view of AKP-as-democratisers led one sympathetic observer to claim that ‘Turkey has established 
itself [as] an example of a well-functioning democracy in the Muslim world, and is repeatedly illus-
trated as a possible model for other Muslim countries’ (Yalçın 2012, p. 206). 
 Notwithstanding intermittent calls to recognise the limits of the party’s conservative 
democracy,  the literature was marked by analyses that set AKP governments’ piecemeal reforms 14
against the background of the recent past. he previous two decades had been shaped by severe 
democratic deicits under the leadership of dysfunctional coalition governments and the military 
junta. Given the patchwork improvements in several areas of governance under AKP rule, particu-
larly where the EU initially acted as an anchor for reform (Mütüler Baç 2005; Kaygusuz 2012; cf. 
Tocci 2005), it would be unfair to wholly dismiss the earlier, positive assessments of the party’s de-
mocratic trajectory. Yet what was missing in many of these accounts tracing the party’s democratic 
reform initiatives was an attention to how the party’s ostensible moves towards greater democratisa-
tion were materialising in contexts beyond the observers’ narrow focus on the institutional compo-
nents of parliamentary democracy. 
 As we have seen, those following the narrative of economic growth emphasised select indicators 
to assess the AKP’s economic performance, and thus, remained inattentive to the broader questions 
surrounding the politics of distribution, employment and state transformation. Similarly, those who 
underlined the narrative of democratic progress oten failed to recognise a trend towards centralis-
ing decision-making, an increasingly interventionist attitude towards various state apparatuses and 
a tendency to marginalise public input when the popular response contradicted the party’s objec-
tives. 
 Many of the initial incarnations of these patterns emerged precisely in the context of the party’s 
‘political’ attempts to facilitate its ‘economic’ programme – e.g. in labour market reforms or in con-
tinual reorganisation of urban planning rights (see Bozkurt-Gürgen 2018; Çelik 2015; Eraydın & 
Taşan-Kok 2014). Individual components of the economic reform packages, such as privatisation 
processes, were increasingly shaped by non-democratic practices and outright corruption, which 
under the AKP rule has become ‘centralised and exists and prevails through making highly debat-
ed, notorious new laws and regulations’ (Çeviker Gürakar 2016, p. 109; see also Buğra & Savaşkan 
2014). In short, those who followed the twin narratives of progress detached the examinations of 
neoliberal reform and democratisation from each other, and thus rendered their analyses incapable 
of recognising how the two processes were co-constitutive. 
A rude awakening: end of the narratives of progress 
Both in the academic literature and in popular writing on Turkey, the AKP-induced democratisa-
tion–economic development narrative started to lounder in the 2007–2011 period, and rapidly 
disintegrated ater 2013. While the 2010 constitutional reform and the highly politicised court cases 
against alleged coup plotters are oten represented as a watershed for AKP’s ‘authoritarian turn’, 
many observers have also underscored the party’s victory in the July 2007 elections as an earlier, but 
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perhaps less explicit, crossing point (Bardakçı 2016, p. 5; Canyaş, Canyaş & Gümrükçü 2016, p. 78). 
Yet it was the government’s response to the Gezi Park protests in 2013 and the subsequent assaults 
on rights that gravely undermined the party’s credentials and self-representation as a vehicle of 
‘civilianisation, democratisation, freedom of belief and equality of opportunity’ (AK Parti n.d.) (see 
Bilgiç 2018). Incidentally, this narrative shit corresponded to AKP’s own discursive reconigura-
tion, as the party gradually replaced its own claim to creating a ‘conservative democracy’ with that 
of a nebulous ‘advanced democracy’ (Alpan 2016, pp. 17–18).  
 he shit to a more critical lens in analyses of AKP’s governance was not only a result of domes-
tic political developments. It was also intimately linked to the successive waves of popular uprisings 
and mobilisations against incumbent rulers in the Middle East and North Africa which created 
ripple effects in social sciences. hese events have not only toppled regimes and transformed the 
political landscape in the region, they have also forced social scientists to reassess and relect upon 
the conceptual and analytical parameters they utilise to study such dynamics.  15
 One such collective episode of soul-searching in the face of failed predictions and models has 
materialised in the atermath of the Gezi Park protests in Turkey. he ‘unexpected’ intensity and 
scale of the protests, coupled with AKP’s heavy-handed crackdown have resulted in a considerable 
shit in the scholarly analysis and commentary of Turkish affairs – especially in the West. Concomi-
tant with this emergent critique of the government’s democratic credentials, the party’s economic 
policy received increased critical scrutiny (Gündüz 2015). Once again, the shit in the scope of 
scholarship was partly a direct response to concrete socio-economic developments in the country, 
which – contrary to the boisterous claims of AKP officials – did not emerge unscathed from the 
2007–2008 global economic crisis (Canyaş, Canyaş & Gümrükçü 2016, p. 78). 
 As outlined earlier, scholarly attempts to explain and conceptualise AKP’s ‘authoritarian turn’ 
have developed in parallel with the production and adoption of different categories. he speciic 
denomination of Turkey’s ‘authoritarianism’ has been variously deined as ‘competitive’ (Özbudun 
2015; Esen & Gümüşçü 2017) or ‘electoral’ (White & Herzog 2016; Chrona & Capelos 2017), and in 
other cases, subsumed under the category of ‘hybrid’ regimes (Öniş 2016). he plethora of concepts 
and deinitions utilised in the analyses of the late AKP period could be interpreted as a sign of theo-
retical innovation. However, there is also a more practical explanation which attributes this concep-
tual expansion to the vicissitudes of Turkish politics: 
Part of the difficulty in pinpointing the exact nature of the new Turkish regime lies in its luid and fast 
evolving nature. Snapshots of the country’s political and institutional environment would yield different 
results if taken before or ater AKP’s third general election victory in 2011, the Gezi protests of the sum-
mer of 2013, the intra-Islamist split between AKP and the Gülen movement in late 2013, the presidential 
election of 2014, the twin elections of June and November 2015, or the failed coup attempt of July 2016. 
While it was still possible to label Turkey a lawed or illiberal democracy before mid-2015, the develop-
ments since the June 2015 election and the July 2016 coup attempt have led more observers to opt for 
sub-categories of authoritarianism instead (Akkoyunlu & Öktem 2016, p. 506). 
A similar attempt was made by Ziya Öniş (2016, p. 142) who identiies three key ‘phases’ for perio-
dising the ebbs and lows of the AKP’s political and economic trajectory. 
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he irst, from late 2002 to 2007, looks in retrospect like a kind of golden age (...) he second phase, 
which spanned the 2007 and 2011 elections, was a time of transition. (...) he third phase, which began 
ater the June 2011 election, saw the virtuous cycle of the irst phase go into reverse. 
Given the intensity and rapid pace of the developments that observers now recognise as the triggers 
of AKP’s authoritarian drit, it is not unreasonable to suggest that prior assessments of AKP gov-
ernments had to be re-negotiated in light of the changing political circumstances. Furthermore, we 
do not refute the claim that the scope of AKP’s authoritarian practices has widened considerably in 
the post 2011–13 period. Yet this oscillating periodisation and the focus on the ‘luidity’ of the 
Turkish regime risks losing sight of the enduring patterns and practices that criss-crossed and con-
nected different ‘phases’ of the AKP rule. Underscoring these ‘phases’ does not help us construct a 
more accurate picture of the ‘authoritarian turn’. On the contrary, this attempt obscures the lineage 
of the policies and tendencies that comprise AKP’s authoritarian statecrat. It makes signiicant por-
tions of the party’s history invisible by presenting them as ‘golden age[s]’ and amorphous ‘time[s] of 
transition’. Inadvertently, these critical interventions overemphasise the post 2011–2013 period as 
the constitutive stage of the party’s authoritarianism and shy away from revisiting the political and 
economic balance sheet of the party’s earlier years in government. Ultimately, the main question 
that drives such investigations is ‘what went wrong?’ – as opposed to how and why was the party 
capable of (re)constructing and strengthening an authoritarian regime? 
 hese accounts are further undermined by a signiicant analytical impasse as they reproduce the 
problematic separation of ‘economic’ and ‘political’ developments in assessing the authoritarian 
trajectory of AKP. he turning points towards authoritarianism identiied in these contributions 
predominantly represent ‘political’ moments. As such, they underestimate how AKP governments’ 
management of ‘the economy’ has long been underpinned by the type of coercive and disciplinary 
strategies that these observers have only begun recognising in the political realm ater 2011–13. 
Attempts to broaden the scope of the analytical parameters utilised in the study of AKP’s ‘authori-
tarian turn’ oten remain comfortably within the conines of the ‘political’. For example, those who 
underscore the validity of ‘competitive authoritarianism’ assert that the concept ‘takes into account 
aspects of a political regime other than its electoral system, thereby allowing us to focus on different 
aspects of AKP’s regime’ (Esen & Gümüşçü 2016, p. 1583). ‘Political’ aspects of the regime are still 
valorised as the prioritised category of analysis, which reinforces a hermetically sealed understand-
ing of a realm of politics separate from ‘the economy.’ his political focus signiicantly erodes the 
concept’s ability to shed light on a host of economic, cultural and ideological patterns and practices, 
that very much constitute AKP’s authoritarian statecrat. 
 he inal part of the paper advances the utility of authoritarian neoliberalism as a remedy for 
both the twin narratives of progress, and the analytical issues that have plagued the accounts that 
(1) neglect the questions of political economy by operating on a disconnected conception of the 
‘economic’ and ‘political’ processes; and/or (2) assume a diametrical opposition between liberal 
democracy and authoritarian statecrat. 
Repertoires of authoritarian neoliberalism 
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We advance the concept of authoritarian neoliberalism in our efforts to understand and explain the 
historical trajectory of AKP’s authoritarian statecrat. he primary utility of deploying this concept 
– as opposed to the many other alternatives outlined above – is that it helps us avoid the pitfall of 
analysing the constitution of authoritarianism through an exclusive focus on ‘political’ processes 
that seemingly deviate from liberal democratic practices. herefore, authoritarian neoliberalism 
overcomes the dichotomous examinations of the ‘economic’ and ‘political’ components of AKP’s 
governance that the other accounts have subscribed to. As we have seen, this has resulted in an in-
ability to detect how the emergent ‘authoritarian’ practices highlighted ater 2011–13 had already 
been in the making in ostensibly ‘economic’ ields, particularly in policy areas directly relevant to 
the expansion of neoliberal restructuring. 
 More importantly, authoritarian neoliberalism, instead of normalising the type of policies that 
have accompanied AKP’s ‘growth’ years, unequivocally underscores the inherently anti-democratic 
tendencies of neoliberalisation. As Ian Bruff (2016, pp. 109–110) elucidates, ‘state-directed coercion 
insulated from democratic pressures (...) is central to the creation and maintenance of a [neoliberal] 
politico-economic order which actively defends itself against impulses towards greater equality and 
democratisation’. In contrast to many adherents of the narratives of progress, we thus chart the 
manifestation of ‘authoritarian’ practices in conjunction with the AKP-led process of neoliberalisa-
tion. 
 he concept assumes two closely related forms in the contributions to this volume. In its de-
scriptive function, authoritarian neoliberalism denotes that Turkey’s transition to electoral democ-
racy ater the 1980 coup did not necessarily spell an end to the authoritarian modalities of rule that 
underpinned the military regime, but rather highlights how practices and institutions enacted in 
the 1980s have been repurposed under civilian rule. As Bedirhanoğlu & Yalman (2010, p. 109) have 
argued, the authoritarian neoliberal ‘form the state had acquired as early as the 1980s has persisted 
since then through the powerful articulation of these [neoliberal] economic, political and cultural 
processes into each other’. his is an important corrective to the accounts that attempt to assess the 
health of Turkish democracy purely on electoral grounds. But the recognition of the enduring lega-
cy of military rule does not, in and of itself, help us shed light on the speciicities of AKP’s authori-
tarianism. 
 To fulil that aim, we highlight the more substantive dimension of the concept which draws 
heavily from the work of Nicos Poulantzas and Stuart Hall. Accordingly, instead of exclusively fo-
cusing on the vestigial practices of the coup era, we deploy the concept to trace how the policies 
and practices that facilitate neoliberalisation engender anti-democratic and disciplinary forms of 
governance. his oten occurs with a view to protecting the primary circuits of capital accumula-
tion, as has been the case in the construction industry during the AKP era (see Balaban 2011). 
hese disciplinary practices are not antithetical to representative democratic regimes; on the con-
trary, following Stuart Hall’s (1979, p. 15) work on authoritarian populism, we contend that an au-
thoritarian neoliberal regime can ‘[retain] most (though not all) of the formal representative insti-
tutions in place’ while also ‘construct[ing] around itself an active popular consent’. 
 hus, authoritarian neoliberalism allows us to reconcile AKP’s electoral support with its majori-
tarian, exclusionary and disciplinary policies. hese policies have increasingly ‘intensiied state con-
trol over every sphere of social life’ and enacted a ‘draconian and multiform curtailment’ of rights 
and liberties (Poulantzas [1978] 2014, pp. 203–204; see Tansel 2017b, pp. 2–4). As a result of this 
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two-dimensional understanding of the concept, some contributions in this volume chart an explicit 
line through from the earlier authoritarian traditions of centre-right politics in Turkey to AKP. 
Others place a stronger emphasis on the party itself as the main agent in the construction of an 
authoritarian neoliberal regime. 
 Our empirical investigations map out the consolidation of authoritarian neoliberalism in sever-
al ields by bringing together important contributions from various branches of the social sciences. 
In line with our insistence on recognising the authoritarian constitution of neoliberal reforms, we 
trace major shits in economic governance with particular reference to labour relations (Bozkurt-
Güngen 2018) and corporate ownership (Yeşil 2018). We interrogate how developments in these 
areas have been linked to the broader transformation of the state under the AKP rule, and how 
these reforms have been enforced through anti-democratic means – oten through executive cen-
tralisation – or have facilitated and normalised further authoritarian practices. We further examine 
the repercussions of the changing politics of security (Kaygusuz 2018) and of consent generation 
(Bilgiç 2018). 
 In her detailed survey of industrial relations during the AKP era, Sümercan Bozkurt-Güngen 
provides an important corrective to the economic narrative of progress discussed above. She high-
lights how successive AKP governments have prioritised ‘the collective/institutional exclusion of 
the labouring classes from policy-making processes’. Bozkurt-Güngen’s study reveals that the in-
creasingly neoliberalised management of the labouring classes unfolded within a context of legal 
and socio-economic reforms which have undermined the rights and protections of workers, and 
raised barriers against trade union mobilisation. 
 Bilge Yeşil’s contribution focuses on a key nexus of governmental discretion and corporate pow-
er, tracing the consolidation of media ownership in pro-government conglomerates within the 
broader trajectory of liberalisation and privatisation. Documenting the institutional and legal re-
forms that have restricted press independence and promoted a pro-AKP media landscape in the 
past decade, Yeşil explores how AKP’s policies in this ield are built on the mechanisms of clien-
telism exploited by previous governments, but are also increasingly relying on direct interventions 
to shape the country’s media system. 
 he inal two contributions by Özlem Kaygusuz and Ali Bilgiç examine the ways in which AKP’s 
authoritarian statecrat has utilised security apparatuses and mobilisation discourses as tools of 
coercion and consent creation. Kaygusuz (2018) situates the expansion of AKP’s disciplinary state-
crat within a global context deined by the rise of ‘neoliberal security state’ forms, but claims that 
the government’s security paradigm has transformed into a more extreme conception of ‘regime 
security’ in the atermath of the coup attempt in 2016. hrough a careful analysis of the AKP-led 
reforms in the judiciary and state security apparatuses, Kaygusuz uncovers the party’s consistent 
commitment to executive centralisation, i.e. assembling key decision-making powers and coercive 
capacities of the state strictly under the aegis of the government. 
 Bilgiç (2018) shits the focus to the party’s discourses of mobilisation and its successful attempts 
at consent creation by providing an analysis of the Gezi Park protests and the government-spon-
sored ‘National Will’ meetings in 2013. Focusing on different subjectivities that the country’s ne-
oliberalisation has produced, Bilgiç uncovers how AKP has succeeded in adopting the historical 
‘national will’ narrative of the Turkish right. his narrative was then deployed by the party to legit-
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imise its majoritarian understanding of politics, and to withstand the popular discontent that the 
Gezi Park protests unleashed in 2013. 
Coda 
he contributions collected in this volume aim not only to enrich the ongoing debates on the na-
ture, limits and prospects of Turkey’s ‘authoritarian turn’, but also to provide an analytical challenge 
and an opportunity for relection in relation to certain frameworks that have been used to assess 
the politics of AKP rule. It is important to stress that the shortcomings of the ‘narratives of 
progress’ uncovered earlier in this paper should be seen as products of the problematic assumptions 
that have underpinned these analyses, rather than as lawed research into or wilful misrepresenta-
tions of AKP’s record. Dichotomous conceptions of ‘the economy’ vs. politics, democracy vs. au-
thoritarianism, and state vs. civil society have prevented many observers from detecting the emer-
gence of certain trends that they would recognise as ‘authoritarian’ only ater they had appeared in 
the realm of formal ‘politics’ (e.g. political interference in the judicial system, crackdown on oppo-
sitional social forces, curtailment of rights, irregularities in elections). Furthermore, the accounts 
that are embedded in these ‘narratives of progress’ have failed to sufficiently interrogate the wide-
ranging consequences of AKP’s economic programme. hey have oten produced positive, short-
termist conclusions derived from a narrow focus on select macroeconomic indicators that effective-
ly legitimised neoliberalisation. 
 In contrast, our contributions underscore that AKP’s recent ‘authoritarian turn’ should be un-
derstood as the single facet of an authoritarian model of governance which was already shaped by 
executive centralisation – at the expense of political oversight and public participation – and sus-
tained by the deployment of the full power of the state in the service of the party’s interests. hese 
interests have largely coalesced around neoliberal policies that have increased the scope and pace of 
commodiication and restructured the state’s regulatory and distributive roles. Nevertheless, despite 
the documented electoral irregularities and overt acts of violence that ensured the party’s survival, 
AKP has also succeeded, to a certain extent, in normalising and legitimising its own authoritarian 
practices, oten through exploiting the existing socio-economic, political and cultural lines of strati-
ication. 
 What are the broader implications of rethinking AKP’s authoritarian trajectory along the lines 
we suggest in this collection? Representing AKP’s ‘authoritarian turn’ as a harbinger of a global 
resurgence in authoritarianism might be misleading (Klaas 2018; cf. Levitsky & Ziblatt 2018). Nev-
ertheless, it is important to highlight that some of the processes that the party has utilised to en-
trench its tight grip on power are already promoted and exploited by other governments across the 
world. Efforts to limit public scrutiny of socio-economic reforms are increasingly documented in 
the global North as well as in the South (see the contributions in Tansel 2017a), while the trend of 
legislating neoliberal restructuring through emergency decrees by the executive has gained rapid 
pace in countries such as Italy and Spain (Cozzolino forthcoming; Clua-Losada & Ribera-Alman-
doz 2017). 
 hus, while the exigencies of the current state of emergency in Turkey and AKP’s success in 
controlling and reshaping state apparatuses might not be replicated in other contexts, both the lib-
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eral democratic and authoritarian forms of capitalism are increasingly facing challenges that propel 
state managers to privilege inherently anti-democratic means of managing crises. We therefore re-
assert the centrality of critically examining the questions of political economy in the ongoing dis-
cussions on democracy and authoritarianism, and urge scholars to take heed of Nancy Fraser’s 
(2015, p. 189) advice: ‘[w]hoever would speak about democracy today must also speak about capi-
talism’. 
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Notes 
 See Bermeo (2016, p. 6, 11); Akkoyunlu & Öktem (2016); Esen & Gümüşçü (2016); Öniş (2016); Börzel & 1
Schimmelfennig (2017, p. 284).
 I use the term ‘popular’ to refer to the analyses and commentaries published for audiences beyond acade2 -
mia, such as magazine articles, newspaper pieces and TV reports.
 In addition to the works discussed throughout the article, see Saatçioğlu (2016); Somer (2016); Waldman 3
& Çalışkan (2017); Öniş & Kutlay (2017); Göl (2017); Sarfati (2017) for other recent contributions to the 
literature on Turkey’s ‘authoritarian turn’.
 he individual contributions to this volume unpack this claim in different empirical domains in detail, but 4
we would also like to highlight the corresponding indings of the Varieties of Democracy project (V-Dem 
2017), which reveals that the ‘democratic backsliding’ in the AKP era was visible as early as 2003–2004.
 Acknowledging this also helps us emphasise the importance of treating the contradictions and auto-cri5 -
tiques that manifest between the analyses written in these two periods (2002–2007/10; 2011–2013 on-
wards) as symptoms of shortcomings inherent in certain approaches and concepts, rather than the out-
comes of inadequate applications of otherwise sound theories.
 his should not be read to the effect that the party’s democratic and economic balance sheet received no 6
critical scrutiny. See, inter alia, Bedirhanoğlu & Yalman (2010); Coşar & Yücesan-Özdemir (2012); 
Bozkurt (2013); Buğra & Savaşkan (2014); Akça, Bekmen & Özden (2014), Boratav (2015) and Çelik 
(2015) for critical engagements with neoliberalism in the AKP period.
 See Bruff (2014); Soederberg (2014); Oberndorfer (2015); Springer (2015); Wigger & Buch-Hansen (2015); 7
Bruff & Wöhl (2016); Yeşil (2016); Roberts (2017); Tansel (2017a); Bruff & Tansel (forthcoming).
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 See also Moore & Dannreuther (2009, p. 155) for the same misconception. Compare these accounts with 8
those of Cahill (2014); Soederberg (2014); and Delwaide (2011) for careful analyses of the role of the state 
in neoliberalism.
 It should be noted that Öniş increasingly highlighted the contradictions of the government’s economic 9
programme, including its reliance on short-term capital inlows (see especially Öniş & Bakır 2007); yet his 
criticisms have fallen short of challenging the core assumptions that drove the policy and rarely questioned 
the problems inherent to the pursuit of a ‘high growth path’ (Öniş 2009, pp. 425–427).
 See Acemoğlu & Üçer (2015); Abramowitz & Barkey (2009); Tür (2011, p. 592); Tol (2012, p. 352); Çağap10 -
tay (2013, p. 800); Sachs (2013); Üçer (2014).
 See Sert & Yıldız (2016, p. 53); Şimşek (2013, p. 439); Çınar & Sayın (2014, p. 366); Esen & Gümüşçü 11
(2016, p. 1584); Ağartan (2016, p. 143).
 See, among others, he New York Times (2004); he Economist (2010). As Claire Berlinski (2017) has 12
documented, the dominant representation of AKP in the Western press was one that highlighted the par-
ty’s reformist, pro-Western and pro-EU attitude.
 See Altunışık (2005, 2008); Atasoy (2011); Bâli (2011); Çağaptay (2014); Taşpınar(2014) for various con13 -
tributions to the debate on the ‘Turkish Model’.
 See, inter alia, Tepe (2005); Çınar (2006); Coşar & Yeğenoğlu (2011); Birdal (2013).14
 See, inter alia, Gause (2011); Schwedler (2015); Valbjørn (2012).15
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